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One-sentence summary: Blockchain technology represents an emerging source of 
venture capital crowdfunding for creative ventures, specifically in the music industry.  
 
 
Key points:  
- Although	music	streaming	is	often	portrayed	as	a	success	story,	the internet has 
in fact been something of a false dawn	for	the	recorded	music	industry	–	
particularly	for emerging	musicians. 	
- New music ventures	might	obtain	alternative entrepreneurial finance	through	
token	sales	or	Initial	Coin	Offerings.	






















Token sales, or Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), are a novel means of using blockchain 
to raise seed finance for new ventures. Neglected to date are the important questions 
token sales raise for the funding of new ventures in the creative industries, for 
instance the music industry. Ten years after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 
2008, the financing landscape globally remains difficult for new ventures, due to the 
credit rationing and retreat of banks and venture capitalists from (VCs) early stage 
venture finance where there is a lack of proven business track record (Wilson and 
Silver, 2013; Lee et al, 2015). Many new types of finance, including various forms of 
crowdfunding, incubator/accelerator, asset finance, online public feeder investment 
markets and social funding have emerged (Bloch et al, 2018). Arguably, however, 
they have had limited impact on creative sectors and notably the recorded music 
industry – the focus of this paper.  
 
New ventures experience information asymmetries (IA) relating to an imbalance of 
market knowledge between themselves and potential investors (Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002), making them particularly vulnerable to investor agency failures. The 
seed investment market is littered with such failures: Akerlof’s (1970) so-called 
‘lemon’ investments. IAs may be most critical for the most innovative and creative 
new ventures, since this is the most difficult market for investors to understand 
(Fraser, 2011). Traditionally this has been overcome not only by independent record 
labels but also by smart, hands-on, industry expert angel investors (Mason and 
Harrison, 2015). However, a problem here is the relatively limited availability and 
access of angel finance: only a small proportion of individuals have the high net 
worth, time and knowledge to invest in this way. In part, this problem has been 
overcome through the emergence, post-GFC, of crowdfunding, which enables a 
greater number of people with smaller amounts of disposable income to invest. 
However, despite the proliferation of new forms of seed venture funding, the creative 
sector and recorded music industry in particular remains relatively poorly funded.   
 
This paper focuses on the music industry, where the evolution of the internet has 
offered something of a false dawn to new musicians. Whilst high profile platforms 
such as YouTube offer new musicians the opportunity to showcase their work, they 
have also contributed to the notion and proliferation of free music and undervaluation 
of recorded music. Furthermore, in such a highly competitive market it remains very 
difficult for new artists to gain recognition. Whilst online music streaming has halted 
the typical annual decline in global revenues for recorded music, with recorded music 
revenues increasing from $14.3 billion in 2014, to $15.7 billion in 2016 (IFPI, 2017), 
the successful financing of new ventures has tended to favour existing artists with 
track records. 99% of streaming income reportedly goes to the most popular 10% of 
tracks (Krukowski, 2018). As such, the music industry remains pyramidal, with a 
relatively small number of established artists, often signed to major labels, earning the 
vast amount of industry income whilst the vast majority earn little or nothing.  
 
A major problem for emerging types of finance is the establishment of a trusted 
network channel of information between the new venture and the investor. Lerner 
(2010) and, more latterly, Lingelbach (2015) have discussed the importance of stable 
institutional, legal and regulatory structures to encourage equity investment and the 
same is likely to be the case for all forms of crowdfunding – particularly equity CF, 
which may take many years to provide repayment. Therefore, establishing trust in the 
platform mechanism (Li and Owen, 2016) is important in encouraging investors. In a 
similar way, we would expect that the blockchain mechanisms and any intermediaries 
operating to promote new ventures would have to offer appropriate trust signals – 
such as regulatory compliance.   
 
The two questions addressed in this paper are: (i) How blockchain might finance new 
recorded music ventures? And (ii) what role policy might play in developing this form 
of seed finance in this industry? The paper proceeds by examining the theoretical 
literature relating to seed venture finance, the role that blockchain might play in 
financing new creative industry activities, with a focus on recorded music industry 
and examination of existing case examples, before discussing the wider implications 
for policy and regulation. 
 
 
Information asymmetries: the need for alternative start-up finance in the music 
industry  
 
It is long recognised (Macmillan, 1931) that financing gaps exist for new and young 
ventures. Evolving entrepreneurial finance theory suggests that IA between new 
venture founders and potential investors is the main cause. For fear of loss of market 
primacy (Baldock, 2015), founders are unable or unwilling to provide sufficient 
information to explain why their venture should receive investment and this is most 
prevalent amongst innovative ventures (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002, Hsu, 2004). 
Indeed, Fraser (2011) suggests that this is particularly problematic for new creative 
ventures, such as in the music industry. If we exclude economic cyclical credit 
rationing factors which are likely to exacerbate the innovative/creative new venture 
funding gap (Cowling et al, 2012; Lee et al, 2015), the problem is best explored in 
terms of the demand-side and supply-side relationship and interactions between new 
ventures and capital market intermediaries (North et al 2013; Baldock et al, 2015; 
Owen et al, 2017).    
 
A further important part of the investor/new venture trust mechanism is the existence 
of a stable investment environment which protects and encourages both parties to 
cooperate and engenders trust through established institutional and regulatory 
frameworks (Lingelbach, 2015). This is particularly important for equity investments 
which may not fully reward investors for many years and to what Gilson (2003) has 
referred as simultaneity theory for engineering venture capital. Subsequently, Lerner 
(2010) described the need for global harmonious laws and regulations which attract 
inward investment and for example, Mason and Owen (2016) refer to the use of 
investor tax break incentives such as the UK Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(SEIS). The US JOBS Act (2013) has been instrumental in establishing equity CF in 
that country and also demonstrating a global lead to providing a regulatory framework 
for this emerging investment industry (Bruton et al, 2015). Therefore, the global 
investment framework offered by blockchain is likely to remain considerably 
restricted from wider market acceptance until international standards and regulations 
are in place. 
 
A fundamental problem in the creative industries is that new ventures typically 
require relatively small amounts of investment, which do not justify the level of due 
diligence required by financial intermediaries. This gives rise to the financing gap 
because investors will prefer to fund at a later stage when market traction is less 
opaque and better understood, and when less risk is attached to the investment 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). Therefore, early stage investment is highly volatile and 
frequently unsuccessful due to agency failures (Akerlof, 1970), whereby insufficiently 
informed investors back ‘lemons’ rather than ‘gems’. Two forms of agency failure are 
commonly noted: adverse selection where lemons are picked because of lack of 
market knowledge and moral hazard where venture founders do not manage the 
business as well as expected.  
 
Over time, the investment market has evolved to overcome these problems through 
intermediary developments. Uzzi (1997, 1999) refers to network ties between new 
ventures and financiers, whereby trust is developed, and relationship banking 
approaches (Udell, 2004) have been perceived as helping to bridge the finance gap 
and deliver more stable, sustainable investment. However, these approaches favour 
existing businesses, or spin-outs, with track records. A more common early-stage 
equity investment approach is therefore to take a so-called ‘smart money’ approach 
(Mason and Harrison, 2015; Baldock and Mason, 2015). This has involved business 
angels, seed venture capitalists (VCs) and accelerators investing in sectors in which 
they have expertise and in new ventures where they can take a hands-on approach to 
managing and guiding the business – thus avoiding moral hazard. Such approaches 
have worked particularly well for new digitech ventures, with shorter investment 
horizons, but are yet to demonstrate development for new music ventures.  
 
Independent record labels might be expected to fill this gap, but some do not even 
offer artists an advance; furthermore, many artists are operating without a record 
label, a phenomenon that is not necessarily as empowering as it is sometimes 
depicted. The conventional wisdom is that the so-called ‘digital revolution’ has 
transformed the music industry, at least for those aspects primarily associated with 
recorded music. This is typically presented as bad news for record companies but 
good news for artists: journalists and popular press authors proclaim a do-it-yourself 
(DIY) revolution in which ‘the artist can communicate, interact, market and sell 
directly to the fan’ and ‘record labels, radio and television become mostly irrelevant’ 
(Owsinski 2009: ix). Some scholars, notably Wikström (2013), also espouse this view 
of a radically new music economy in which artists, rather than record labels, are in 
control. Yet this viewpoint has been challenged by Rogers (2013), who insists that the 
Internet has not fundamentally altered power relations: for all the DIY, direct-to-fan 
rhetoric, a handful of very large corporations in fact continue to dominate. We may 
hear claims for the democratisation of production and circulation of music, but 
Hesmondhalgh (2013: 346-7) argues that stories of artists achieving success ‘via the 
web’, without the assistance of ‘the music industry’, rarely stand up to scrutiny. If 
there was a shift of power away from record labels in the first decade of the twenty-
first century, Hesmondhalgh suggests, it was not towards artists but rather towards 
technology companies such as Apple and Amazon; power remains ‘in the hands of a 
few institutional entities’ (2013: 348). With the rise of digital audio workstations, and 
platforms such as Soundcloud, Bandcamp and YouTube, it has never been easier to 
record and distribute music. With lower barriers to entry, however, has come 
increased competition. Without the resources of a major record label, or at least a 
large independent, this music is likely to remain way down in the ‘long tail’ 
(Anderson 2006). 
 
It is true that some artists have attracted attention for innovative approaches to 
releasing music. The British rock band, Radiohead, adopted an ‘honesty box’, or ‘pay 
what you like’, pricing mechanism for their 2007 album, In Rainbows, while the 
American industrial band Nine Inch Nails, essentially a Trent Reznor solo act, 
released their 2008 album, Ghosts I-IV, under a license that allowed fans to remix and 
redistribute its songs as they chose. What is often overlooked, however, is that these 
were not debut albums: both Reznor and Radiohead benefitted immeasurably from the 
exposure they had already achieved when signed to major record labels. Equally 
significantly, Radiohead went on to license In Rainbows to record labels for a more 
traditional CD release, while Reznor went on to sign a new deal with a major label, 
acknowledging that ‘complete independent releasing has its great points but also 
comes with shortcomings’ (Wikström 2013: 2). The DIY approach, then, poses 
challenges even for established artists; for emerging artists, it is more problematic 
still. For Hesmondhalgh, this is because only record labels (or their tech company 
equivalents) have the necessary resources:  
 
The problem, as ever, remained one of circulation: how to let people know of 
the existence and desirability of the product? And how, in the business school 
jargon, to achieve ‘product differentiation’? Most people still became aware of 
musical recordings via radio, television and other ‘old’ media. And the surest 
way to gain access to such old media was via a contract with a vertically 
integrated major record company, which had the resources, and occasionally 
the expertise, to target appropriate consumers (Hesmondhalgh 2013: 348). 
 
Macklemore and Ryan Lewis, an American hip-hop duo, may have reached number 
one on the US Billboard Hot 100 chart in 2013 with a track released on Macklemore’s 
own record label, for instance, yet the single was in fact distributed by a company 
owned by a major record label. Similarly, while it is true that Michael Omari, the 
British grime artist better known as Stormzy, topped the UK album charts without a 
record label in 2017, he had a deal with the same, major-label-owned distributor – 
and, as we go to press, it has been announced that Omari has signed a deal with 
Atlantic Records. All artists can self-release and self-distribute music, then, but the 
vast majority of those who have the option are still working with major labels – or 
their tech giant equivalents. American hip-hop artist Chancelor Jonathan Bennett, 
who produces music under the name Chance the Rapper, made headlines for winning 
three Grammy awards in 2017 as an unsigned artist – yet he had the backing of Apple, 
worth several times more than all three major record labels combined. Currently, then, 
while a few artists attract an early stage corporate investment from major labels and 
music publishers, most receive angel-type investment from smaller ‘independent’ 
record labels and publishers – or they engage in bootstrapping activity (Mac an 
Bhaird and Lucy, 2015), working for free or for very low pay, self-funding recording 
and live performances whilst hoping to catch the eye of an independent or corporate 
investor. This inevitably leaves new artists vulnerable to protracted periods of poor 
pay and failure to secure funding for potentially successful projects.  
 
Crowdfunding is sometimes proposed as an alternative finance source: the American 
singer-songwriter Amanda Palmer famously raised $1,192,793 on the Kickstarter 
crowdfunding platform for her 2012 album Theatre Is Evil. It is true that the 
alternative investment activity brought about through the rise of crowdfunding post-
GFC (Lehner, 2014) has offered a potential opportunity. Palmer’s success is unusual, 
however: as of January 2018, just under half (49.45%) the music projects on 
Kickstarter have been successfully funded, and the sums raised are typically far 
smaller than that raised by Palmer. Like Radiohead and Reznor, Palmer’s innovative 
release strategy also benefitted very significantly from the fact that she already had a 
substantial fanbase, built up when signed to a major label imprint with her ‘Brechtian 
punk cabaret’ duo, the Dresden Dolls. Even an apparently ‘alternative’ source of 
finance such as crowdfunding, then, is not as promising for emerging artists as is 
sometimes suggested. Jegeleviciute and Valanciene (2014) identify five models of 
crowdfunding: donation, reward, debt, equity and royalty. Music crowdfunding has 
largely been restricted to a 'reward' model, in which funders receive a pre-determined 
product or service for their contribution. This is problematic as it appeals only to a 
relatively limited number of committed fans in certain genres, whose support is semi-
philanthropic. Fraud is also a challenge, in that 'in general, the parties [in the 'reward' 
model] do not consider it a legally binding obligation to provide the goods and do not 
classify it as a sale' (De Buysere et al 2012). Sustainability is also an issue, as a strong 
reliance on the emotional investment of fans can result in cynicism towards future 
campaigns if artists are perceived to disengage from fans once the project is complete 
(Coleman 2015); there is a danger of ‘going to the well one too many times’ 
(Davidson and Poor 2014). Importantly, the 'reward' model does not offer funders a 
fair share of value. For musicians, then, and emerging musicians in particular, the 
DIY potential of the digital era is being restricted by a lack of access to capital – and 
traditional crowdfunding has not proved a viable alternative.  
 
Ultimately, new artists remain unlikely to break out of their local market, in which 
they may be known through live performance, or from an equally small online market 
developed through posting recorded music that is consumed for free. Indeed, the 
inability of new artists to signal their value to the finance markets is another 
component of the information asymmetry which contributes to entrepreneurial finance 
gaps for early stage ventures (Mueller et al, 2012). This alongside pecking order 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) preferences, which typically favour external debt finance 
over equity, can be seen as contributing to the demand-side failure hypothesis (Owen 
et al, 2017), which indicates that a major part of the early stage finance gap is down to 
the poor knowledge and application skills of the new entrepreneurs. The suggestion 
here, then, is that new creative artists would benefit from improved investor readiness, 
which would enable them to better consider, seek/apply and access a far wider range 
of external finance options (Mason and Kwok, 2010).  
 
 
Accessing start-up finance through blockchain technology  
 
Blockchain technology is a type of distributed ledger ‘composed of a chain of 
cryptographically linked “blocks” contained in batched transactions’ (Hileman and 
Rauchs, 2017: 11). The technology first emerged underpinning the digital currency, 
bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008); although it is now acknowledged that blockchain’s 
importance extends far beyond bitcoin (Kewell and Peter Michael Ward 2017), it 
remains most widely discussed in the context of financial services. Yet blockchain 
technology provides an exciting application space for innovation in diverse domains 
(Adams et al 2017), including social and solidarity-based finance (Scott et al 2017), 
global development (Kewell et al 2017), and business and management (White 2017). 
Blockchains and other distributed ledger technologies are creating fresh opportunities 
for value creation and capture (Maull et al 2017), disrupting governance structures 
(Shermin 2017) and reconfiguring the global economy (Manski 2017).  
 
Blockchains could also have a significant impact on the creative industries, including 
digital art (McConaghy et al 2017) and the music industry (O’Dair and Beaven 2017). 
The technology has been adopted by music start-ups in a range of contexts, from 
combating ‘secondary ticketing’ (Aventus, Guts, Hello Sugoi) to addressing the 
challenges of metadata and licensing (Jaak, Blokur, Dot Blockchain Music). As 
Dredge (2017) argues, there is no such thing as ‘a standard blockchain music start-
up’:  
 
Some… companies are working on Bandcamp-style D2C [direct to consumer] 
platforms for artists, while others are Spotify-style streaming services. Some 
are trying to crack the age-old industry problem of a global database of rights, 
while others hope to encode those rights into the music itself, akin (although 
this can be a controversial point) to a DRM [digital rights management] 
wrapper. And these are just the ones we have obvious existing non-blockchain 
examples to compare them to (Dredge 2017: 1-2). 
 
Dredge (2018) profiles a grand total of 36 music start-ups utilising blockchain 
technology, from Aventus, a ticketing company, to Zimrii Music, a platform offering 
smart contracts, analytics and crowdfunding features to independent artists. And even 
that list of 36 is not exhaustive: other music blockchain start-ups include Singular 
DTV, Tokit, Current and Singular X (Singular DTV 2018). It is difficult to generalise 
about these companies as they vary considerably. For Dredge, the time has come to 
stop talking about them as unified by their use of blockchain technology; instead, he 
argues, we should classify them by the use to which they are putting this technology. 
‘Are they a streaming service? A distribution platform for artists? A ticketing 
service?’ (Dredge 2018: 10). Dredge quotes Phil Barry, originally of Ujo Music and 
now CEO of Blokur: ‘It is easy to get distracted by focusing too much on blockchain 
technology itself rather than the product or service. Ultimately, what matters is 
whether a problem is being solved’ (Dredge 2018: 10).  
 
O’Dair et al (2016) have suggested that blockchain technology also has the potential 
to encourage music seed funding, in three main ways. First, ‘the transparency inherent 
in delivery of music via blockchain technology could improve investor ability to 
monitor activity and investment outcomes, facilitating the modelling of likely returns 
and potentially affecting the pricing of capital’ (O’Dair et al 2016, 14). To date, 
alternative funding models such as the UK’s Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(SEIS) tax breaks and its underpinning of crowdfunding investment, private seed VC 
and business angel activities have made limited impact for artists attempting to 
operate without a record label, due in part to the difficulty of understanding a clear 
pathway to profitability for some artists and of effectively assessing, and therefore 
pricing, capital. Secondly, O’Dair et al state that blockchain technology could support 
the emergence of ‘artist accelerators’, akin to technology start-ups:  
 
The possibility for fully automated monitoring of artists throughout their 
careers, via smart contracts, could make this ‘accelerator’ model relevant to 
artists, opening up the sector to new sources of capital seeking high-risk and 
highly scalable businesses for seed or venture capital. The opportunity to ‘hot 
house’ a group of emerging artists, offering access to resources, mentoring, 
facilities and networking in exchange for a small stake in their future sound 
recording income, paid automatically via smart contracts [‘programmable 
transactions’ executed on a blockchain], might become a viable business 
model for portfolio investors (O’Dair et al 2016, 14).  
 
Finally, O’Dair et al suggest that ‘blockchain technology could have a significantly 
effect on crowdfunding, with artists issuing their own shares or tokens and smart 
contracts guaranteeing that pledge contributions would be returned were funding 
targets not met’ (O’Dair et al 2016, 14).  
 
The explosion of ‘token sales’ since 2016, when O’Dair et al published their report, 
has drawn attention, in particular, to the final model that they identify: crowdfunding 
on the blockchain. Popularly, though somewhat problematically, known as ‘initial 
coin offerings’ or ICOs, token sales are essentially crowdfunding campaigns in which 
investors receive ‘tokens’ in return for a contribution in cryptocurrency – such as 
bitcoin, if deploying the Bitcoin blockchain, or ether, for projects utilising the 
alternative Ethereum blockchain. (These are two of the most prominent 
cryptocurrencies; there are numerous others.) Token sales face three significant 
challenges. Firstly, the current interest in token sales has the hallmarks of a 
speculative bubble. Secondly, they face considerable legal and regulatory uncertainty. 
And thirdly, token sales vary wildly, with only a minority of tokens offering fractional 
ownership in the value of the underlying organisation. ‘Some tokens are similar to 
currencies, others are more like securities, and others have properties that are entirely 
new’ (Conley 2017: 1). At the same time, token sales are undoubtedly a noteworthy 
development in terms of access to capital and, though this is a novel means of raising 
finance, the sums raised are already significant: over $4 billion to date (Russolillo 
2017). Strikingly, start-ups raised more money from token sales in 2017 than through 
traditional VC funding. The ramifications for start-up finance, in sectors including 
music and other creative industries, could be highly significant. 
 
Some individual artists have already used blockchain technology to issue their own 
tokens. The first to do so was the American singer-songwriter Tatiana Moroz, who 
issued Tatianacoin in 2014. In 2017, André Anjos, a Portuguese dance music artist 
who goes by the moniker RAC, also released a token. Unlike bitcoin and ether, 
however, neither of these coins has a significant financial value: the artists in question 
seem to regard them as tools to drive fan engagement rather than as sources of capital. 
Yet for Denis Jašarević, a Slovenian electronic music producer and DJ better known 
as Gramatik, issuing an artist coin has very much been a means of raising capital. 
Jašarević launched his GRMTK token in 2017 and, in just 24 hours, raised a sum, in 
ether, at the time worth $2.25 million. Some who purchased GRMTK tokens may 
simply have been speculating: they are likely to sell their tokens if and when they 
have sufficiently increased in value. Others may be attracted by the fact that Jašarević 
is working with Singular DTV, ‘a blockchain entertainment studio’ that itself raised 
$7.5 Million in ether – in just 17 minutes – via a token sale in 2017. What is 
noteworthy about Jašarevic’s project, however, is that the GRMTK token does appear 
to have an underlying utility: unlike the ‘reward’ model crowdfunders examined 
earlier in this paper, token holders are entitled to a share of Gramatik’s future revenue: 
 
GRMTK isn’t just a cryptocurrency, it’s much more than that, now my 
audience can share in my inspiration and success by also owning the rights 
and royalties of my music and anything I create and distribute on my 
upcoming channel. If you hold 100 GRMTK tokens, then you own 100 tokens 
worth of the rights and royalties of the music and projects I create (Bein 
2017). 
 
To date, other music ventures that use blockchain technology as a means of raising 
capital have tended to be companies rather than individual artists. Aventus, for 
example, is a London-based start-up using blockchain technology to build an open-
source standard for ticketing, in an attempt to counter ticket touting and counterfeit 
tickets. In 2017, in a token sale that lasted just seven minutes, the company raised, in 
ether, the equivalent of approximately $18.7 million. Like GRMTK, their token – 
AventCoin, or AVT – has underlying utility: it is used to align the incentives of 
network participants. Specifically, AVT is used in two broad scenarios: to provide 
‘stake-weighted voting to verify events and applications on the protocol, as a means of 
de-siloing of the event ticketing industry’ and to provide ‘stake-weighted matching of 
buyers and sellers in the secondary market, as part of preventing unregulated touting’ 
(Aventus 2017). 
 
A third instance of a music start-up using blockchain technology to raise capital is 
Viberate, ‘a crowdsourced live music ecosystem and blockchain-based marketplace’ 
which matches musicians to booking agents and event organisers. In 2017, in a token 
sale lasting less than five minutes, Viberate raised approximately $10.7 million in 
ether. Again, their token, VIB, has utility: it can be used for global community 
activation, to access to premium industry contacts, to buy merchandise, to pay 
booking fees, for advertising opportunities on the Viberate website and, finally, to 
purchase tickets. Users who contribute to the company’s database, or who promote 
their service on social media, can also be rewarded with VIB.  
 
What is clear from these three brief case studies is that significant sums can be raised 
via token sales – often in a matter of minutes. To date, the use of token sales to raise 
capital in the music industry has tended to be by companies, rather than individual 
artists. The case of Denis Jašarević, however, demonstrates the potential for artists to 
use token sales to access a much wider range of external finance options. At the same 
time, the token sale is no silver bullet. Information asymmetries persist – and, since 
only sellers can accurately assess the value of a token through examining a project 
before a sale, there is a danger of ‘lemon’ tokens, as a recent Allen and Overy report 
noted:  
 
The flow of information is mostly one-sided, from seller to buyer, and in many 
cases social influencers are leveraged to maximise on the overall hyped 
market sentiment that ‘cryptocurrencies are on an upward trend’. Therefore, 
the token buying public, who may know little or nothing about the issuing 
organisation and the technical concepts behind the offering, can only trust that 
the issuer and its spokespersons are truthful, competent and committed to 
delivering what is stated. No one, apart from the issuer can truly know the 
answer to this, and as the issuer has no fiduciary duty to the token holders, 
they can pretty much say anything to maximise interest in the ICO and the 
ongoing demand for the issued tokens! (Sehra et al 2017, 19) 
 
‘All signs,’ Sehra et al (2017, 21) conclude, ‘point to the ICO and token market 
suffering from lemon conditions’.  
 
The most effective way to fix a lemons market, according to Narayanan et al (2016, 
183), is though regulation. What, then, are the risk mitigation options available to 
policymakers, both in terms of blockchain technology in general and specifically in 
relation to token sales?  
 
 
Implications for policymakers 
 
The ‘cypherpunks’, to whose anarcho-libertarian ideology blockchain technology is 
indebted (Golumbia 2016), are inherently opposed to regulation: as Narayanan et al 
(2016, 183) state, ‘regulation often gets a bad name, especially among the kind of 
people who tend to like bitcoin.’ From the corporate sector, too, the usual refrain is 
that policymaker interference will stifle innovation (Britto and Castillo 2016, 69). Yet 
is a laissez-faire approach to blockchain technology appropriate? Guadamaz and 
Marsden (2015, 12) state that the lack of regulation to date has served to encourage 
scams and fraudsters. Part of the problem is that bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies 
exist in a legal grey area (Grinberg 2011, 207); while to one regulator, a 
cryptocurrency might look like a money transmittal system, to others, it resembles a 
commodity or non-voting capital share of stock (Evans 2015, 108). Another problem 
is that regulating a cryptocurrency such as bitcoin is almost impossible – and even if it 
were possible, it is likely that another cryptocurrency would simply replace it 
(Kaplanov 2012, 167). None of this, however, means that regulation should be 
ignored. As Narayanan et al (2016, 188) put it, ‘if bitcoin is big enough to matter, 
then it is big enough to be regulated’. Given their interest in maintaining capital 
controls, in preventing money laundering, and in preventing the sorts of crime 
(kidnapping, extortion, tax evasion) that can be carried out using cryptocurrencies, 
government interest in blockchain technology seems inevitable (Narayanan et al 
2016, 178-9). There is also the danger that, for all the rhetoric of decentralisation, 
blockchain-based systems could evolve into oligarchies without appropriate 
institutional protection (Boucher 2017, 23).  
 
What then are the options for policymakers? Lessig (2006) states that online activity 
is regulated by legal and digital rules, and a theory of regulation should address both 
aspects. This is also the position of Lehdonvirta and Ali (2016), who make a further 
distinction between governance (rule-making by participants in a given system) and 
regulation (rule-making by external authorities). Regulation of a permissioned ledger, 
Lehdonvirta and Ali suggest, is relatively straightforward: it is simply a case of 
imposing legal obligations on the proprietor. They concede, however, that regulation 
of an unpermissioned ledger such as bitcoin is significantly more challenging, since 
there is no single legal entity in control of the system. Instead, the only practical 
option is to regulate the intermediaries, such as exchanges and wallet providers. 
Guadamaz and Marsden (2015, 11-12) reach a similar conclusion, since allowing 
virtual currency providers to serve as regulators has not proved successful, and neither 
have attempts at prohibition, while the introduction of a central body to provide 
regulation runs counter to the ethos of cryptocurrencies. It is also possible for 
governments to provide support for users of virtual currencies to agree upon and 
enforce their own rules of conduct, Guadamaz and Marsden suggest, but this is likely 
to be only partially effective. Like Lehdonvirta and Ali, then, Guadamaz and Marsden 
conclude that selective regulation, for instance through taxation or regulation of 
intermediaries, is the most promising option.  
 
For a sense of how selective regulation might look in practice, we can turn to the New 
York BitLicense, proposed by the New York Department of Financial Services in 
2014 and issued the following year. Business that require a BitLicense are required to 
provide information on ownership; finances and insurance; and on their business plan. 
They also have to pay a fee. The requirements, then, are substantial, analogous to the 
sort of requirements for a mutual fund or publicly traded stock (Narayanan et al 2016, 
188). The license, then, was an understandable attempt to regulate the space, but the 
consequence was that numerous blockchain businesses simply ceased doing business 
in New York State (Roberts 2015, De Castillo 2015). For a globally distributed 
technology such as blockchain, regional, and even national, solutions are only ever 
going to be partially effective. As Boucher states:  
 
The decentralised, cross-boundary character of blockchain raises jurisdictional 
issues as it seems to diffuse institutional accountability and legal responsibility 
in an unprecedented manner, rendering the need for a more harmonised 
regulatory approach at the transnational level more pertinent compared with a 
local or regional one (Boucher 2017, 23).  
 
The best option for blockchain stewardship, then, may well be the multistakeholder 
approach advocated by Tapscott and Tapscott (2017). Their argument runs as follows:  
 
We cannot leave governance of such complex global innovations solely either 
to governments or to the private sector: political and commercial interests 
have proven insufficient to ensure that this new resource serves society. 
Rather, and more than ever, we need multistakeholders to collaborate as 
equals and provide global leadership. We need all three pillars of modern 
civilization – the private sector, the public sector and civil society – to 
participate in stewarding this new global resource (Tapscott and Tapscott 
2017, 28). 
 
Certainly, policymakers will need to proceed carefully, perhaps adopting the stage-
by-stage process set out by Lehdonvirta and Castronova (2014), which begins with 
interest aggregation before proceeding to policy process (with the involvement of 
members of the public as well as rigorous testing); policy implementation; and, 
finally, policy assessment. Some attempt to regulate the blockchain space, however, 
does seem necessary, not least since ‘smart contracts’, or programmable transactions 
implemented on a blockchain, pose new types of problem. ‘Decentralised autonomous 
organisations’, or DAOs, essentially bundles of smart contracts that could exist almost 
completely independent of human intervention, are more problematic still, existing in 
a regulatory grey zone that may not offer liability, protection or accountability 
guarantees (Boucher 2017). Indeed, Wright and De Filippi (2015) suggest that the 
widespread adoption of blockchain technology will require a new legal paradigm: 
what they call Lex Cryptographia. Blockchain technology, Wright and De Filippi 
assert, could make individual behaviour more difficult to regulate through national 
laws and regulations, while markets created or maintained by DAOs will not readily 
allow for government interventions. The open nature of blockchain-based architecture 
is a significant challenge too. At the same time, Wright and De Filippi state, there is a 
danger that regulation ‘can undercut the powerful interconnectivity of the Internet and 
traditional notions of free expression’ (2015, 57). Regulation should be encouraged, 
agrees Kiviat (2015, 607), but policymakers should exercise caution and precision in 
tailoring its scope.  
 
Having examined policy implications for blockchain technology in general, it is now 
necessary to examine possible policymaker responses to the specific subject of token 
sales. Tokens can vary widely: a token may represent a share in a company or a 
prepayment voucher for future services; it may not offer any discernible value at 
all. A key question is whether tokens have utility or whether they are better 
understood as securities. This is one reason that the utility of the tokens examined 
earlier – VIB, GRMTK and AVT – is important, and also one reason that they are 
unusual: utility tokens might represent less than 10% of the total number of tokens 
issued (Kharif 2017). If the other 90% of tokens fit the definition of securities then, 
according to the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States, they are 
subject to investor disclosure and registration requirements (SEC 2017). From a UK 
perspective, token sales are typically beyond the remit of the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA), not least because sales often take place overseas. The FCA has set 
out some of the resulting challenges: token sales offer no investor protection; tokens 
tend to be volatile in terms of financial value; there is a danger of fraud; there is often 
inadequate documentation; and finally, since token sales are often for projects in their 
very early stages, there is a reasonable chance that investors will lose any money 
invested (FCA 2017). As Boucher (2017, 21) states, equity offerings in blockchain 
companies ‘may place companies within the existing securities market’ and its 
associated rules and obligations; ‘by operating outside of a regulatory framework, 
blockchain-based organisations that are not incorporated or legally recognised may be 
at risk of investment fraud and malicious hacks, and their members could be exposed 
to liabilities as partners’.  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that, while cypherpunks and corporates alike my 
traditionally resist regulation, there is in fact evidence that many would welcome 
some increase in the regulation of token sales (PWC 2017). While new legislation, or 
more active application of existing regulation, is likely to increase costs, it is also 
likely to open the asset class to new categories of investors and therefore a deeper 
pool of capital (Sehra et al 2017). It seems clear that clarity from policymakers 
attracts business: Hong Kong, Singapore and Switzerland are considered areas of 
excellence for token sales because they offer ‘regulatory clarity and an established 
ecosystem of service providers and talent’ (PWC 2017, 10). Given the progress made 
by countries including Singapore and Dubai, notes Lord Holmes, the United Kingdom 
has work to do if it wishes to secure its position as a global leader in technology-
based innovation (2017: 1).  
 
One final point: policymakers need to recognise that blockchain technology has the 
ability to transform the creative industries, as well as areas such as financial services, 
healthcare and insurance. It may be true that the main sectors for token sales in 2017 
were infrastructure (38.4%), trading and investing (13.8%), finance (10.1%), data 
storage (9.4%) and payments (7.1%); the only creative industry to feature at all, is 
gaming and VR, at 4%, while music and other creative ventures fall within the 17.2% 
‘other’ category (PWC 2017). Yet as is clear from the VIB, GRMTK and AVT 
tokens, significant sums have been raised in music too. More importantly, blockchain 
technology is not only being used to finance new creative ventures, the subject 
examined in this paper, but also to introduce traceability and transparency into fashion 
supply chains; to securely link digital assets, from visual images to music files, to 
associated authorship information; and to license content via smart contracts. The 
creative industries are acknowledged as a great strength of the United Kingdom – 
indeed, the phrase itself is the invention of Tony Blair’s Labour Government (Flew 
2012). Yet the creative industries are not mentioned in the Government Office for 
Science 2016 report on blockchain and distributed ledger technology, nor in the 
follow-up by Holmes (2017). Under the DCMS umbrella, ‘digital’ is grouped with 





The paper has demonstrated the potential of blockchain technology, and specifically 
token sales, as an emerging source of VC crowdfunding. To date, however, its 
application in the music industry has been limited, especially among musicians. The 
clear challenge for the future of blockchain as a seed finance mechanism for new 
music ventures is to achieve widespread public consumer credibility. Two apparent 
avenues for future development which may indeed enable new artists to raise CF on 
the blockchain are (i) the development of effective light touch regulation that can 
enhance investor confidence and gain blockchain industry buy-in, and (ii) the 
development of intermediary (‘infomediary’) services which offer promotional 
platforms to emerging artists. The two appear interrelated, since the regulation of 
intermediary services would appear to be the most effective way of instilling investor 
confidence and avoiding the perils of a lemon market and token sale crash if and 
when the current bubble bursts. 
 
Whilst these new infomediary services are not the focus of this paper, they offer 
potential for promotion and trust development in the same way that online services 
such as Uber or Airbnb have offered the transport and holiday rental markets 
respectively. While much of the rhetoric around blockchain technology relates to 
disintermediation, we see this as a ‘thinning’ of intermediaries rather than their 
complete removal. We await the development of new music intermediaries in music 
that go beyond the current streaming services. The challenge is to find sustainable, 
value-creating approaches, in which incentives are fully aligned. If properly designed 
and offering genuine utility, tokens could be fundamental to such approaches. The 
challenge for policy makers, meanwhile, is to encourage such ventures in the UK – a 
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